A plausibility model for regret games

Published in Multi-Agent Systems and Agreement Technologies, 2017

Recommended citation: Your Name, You. (2009). "Paper Title Number 1." Journal 1. 1(1). https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-01713-2_14

We develop a plausibility model by defining a new notion of rationality based on the assumption that a player believes that she doesn’t play a regret dominated strategy. Especially, we show that the interactive epistemic outcomes of this type of rationality are in line with the solutions of the Iterated Regret Minimization (IRM) algorithm. So, we state that one can achieve a characterization of the IRM algorithm by keeping upgrading the assumption of rationality, and we obtain common belief of rationality in the limit model. A benefit of our characterization is that it provides the epistemic foundation to the IRM algorithm and solve a dynamic information problem best expressed through the Traveler’s Dilemma.

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